The doctrine of Preemption and Going to War in Iraq

While going through the readings for tomorrow’s class, one of the sentences that impacted me the most were the ones that Barak Obama said: that the war of Iraq was a «war of choice» (Immerman, 2015, p. 89). And also made me reflect once again about the essay of Giorgo Agamben about the State of Exception. Although the IC was unable to find crucial evidence regarding the WMD (weapons of mass destruction), the Bush administration pushed the events. Was it because it was easier for them to push that war, using the more comfortable situation the state of exception provided? The Congress, which should be the independent legislative power, was not able to stop the executive, making the division of powers more diffuse. The CIA felt the need change the focus to the Republic of Iraq instead of Al Qaeda with the pressure of the vice-president Dick Cheney’s office. As it usually happens during the State of Exception: the borders for what is considered legal become more difficult to define, and the law is no longer what rules the State. For that reason, it was easier for the executive to do his will.

That situation certainly helped to take the decision to invade Iraq and to get information using torture, because, as Stuart Mill would say, the decisions made were to reach a “telos” or greater good. Although a report about the bad consequences of those actions for the US and Western democracies was made. A decision (followed by the war with Afghanistan) that helped to create the pop out the branch of al Qaeda that killed 193 people in my country (most of them Muslims). And, nowadays, it helped to emerge new terrorist organizations such as ISIS, which is now able to recruit terrorist within the borders of the enemies they are fighting. Tragically, we cannot turn back in time. And, as Immerman says in his conclusion, without a «cultural revolution» (Immerman, 2015, p. 94), it is unlikely to help change things and prioritize analysis and deep understanding of the situations before attacking.

Also, another quote in Immerman’s paper that made me think was when he mentions that President Bush «had successfully mobilized domestic and even international support» (Immerman, 2015, p. 88). And it makes me question again one thing… Did truly the Bush administration forced the need to invade Iraq in all the Americans (and even other countries) or it was also a mix of social pressure and views of what the government should do? Of course, speeches like the one Bush gave when he addressed the State of the Union » (Ehrenberg et. Al., 2010, p. 60) help to spread his support. I think chapter 3 in Counter Jihad gives an excellent explanation of how the government sold that war to the people, but, still, the general ambiance and immediate cultural responses helped the government to push that situation and spread unconfirmed information (Bin Laden and Hussein’s linking or the yellowcake uranium from Niger).