Operation Iraqi Freedom

In The Iraq Papers, documents 4.6 and 4.7 raised many questions for me based on the lack of communication between the Bush Administration and its effect on the Iraqi people. In the weeks prior to May 12, 2003 the State Department, the Department of Defense, the CIA, as well as the vice president's office were divided on how far was to far with the “de-Baathification”. The State Department and the CIA advocated for a moderate policy, whereas the Department of Defense and the vice president's office advocated for a radical purge of the Baath Party. Condoleezza Rice’s proposed compromise passed with only 1% of the Party would be fired and barred from further employment in the public sector. However thanks to Rumsfeld, Cheney, and L. Paul Bremer who “repeatedly insisted that he had his orders to do away with the Baath Party, the Iraqi Government, and the armed forces” (183). Which he claimed “that he had cleared the matter at the highest levels of government” (183). Observers have denied this claim and made an even more unsettling claim of their own, that Rumsfeld and Cheney had maneuvered around the President of the United States as well as other heads of government. The Coalition Provisional Authority Order Numbers 1 and 2 are problematic on the basis of the false implementation of them, when the were not approved. This is problematic for two main reasons, first the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations, and other government institutions were subjected to investigation. The institutions they are referring to are hospitals and universities, you would think that you would attempt to keep the higher ups in these institutions around to further the reach and availability of these crucial institutions in a time of war. Second, they undermine the culture of Iraq that citizens had become accustomed to under Saddam Hussein. The dissolution of entities listed 24 different organizations to be disbanded, including: Iraqi Intelligence Service, and all of the military organizations to name a few. This kind of disruption to the structure of a culture where unemployment in 2003 reached an all time high of 28.10 percent, would have been detrimental to the citizens employed in these positions, who suddenly would have been  left unemployed and financially struggling. One can see how this cultural and governmental “Shock and Awe” based reform was a major failure in the eyes of the Iraqi people, as well as CPA's Director of Policy Planning Andrew Rathmell.